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This paper statistically analyzes 1^ years of NAVAIRSYSCOMHQ
fixed-price incentive contract experience in the aircraft and missile
procurement field. The relation of basic contract parameters to con-
tract outcome is explored through regression and analysis of variance
techniques.
The inferences arising from the statistical analysis are combined
with other information to draw conclusions regarding incentive contract-
ing. The most important of these is that there is no evidence that the
negotiated sharing ratio has any influence on the contractor during the
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I. INTRODUCTION
A. FIXED -PRICE INCENTIVE CONTRACTS - THEORY AND PRACTICE
1
. Theory (from the government's viewpoint)
The basic parameters of a fixed-price incentive (FPl) contract
are: target cost, range of incentive effectiveness (RIE), sharing
ratio, ceiling price, and target profit.
Fixed-price incentive contracts are intended to be used for
engineering development, management support, and production contracts
in which the imcertainty of cost is too large to allow a firm fixed-
price (FFP) contract. In terms of cost, this means approximately +_
1 5 to 20^ variation about the negotiated target cost. If the range
of cost uncertainty is larger than this, a cost reimbursable contract
is indicated. If significantly smaller, a FFP contract should be
considered.
FPI contracts are further subdivided into those involving a
cost incentive alone, and those having schedule and/or performance
incentives as well as a cost incentive. Both the cost incent,ive and
multiple incentive contracts may have firm target(s), FPIF, or suc-
cessive targets, FPIS. The contracts analyzed in this thesis are FPIF
and FPIS contracts with cost incentives only.
Theory has it that the contractor will be influenced to effec-
tively control costs and to make cost-associated trade-off decisions
in a way favorable to his profit and therefore favorable to the govern-
ment. The government's desires with regard to the cost outcome of a
contract are comm.unicated to the contractor in the form of the mutually
agreed upon sharing ratio. This ratio, e.g., 80/20, says to the

contractor that his profit vjill increase $.20 for every dollar he saves
in cost throughout the RIE, and vice versa. The RIE is chosen so as to
encompass all likely contract cost outcomes including the most likely
outcome (the target cost). Insurance against a massive cost overrun is
provided by another parameter, ceiling price. This figure tells the
contractor the maximum the government will pay, cost + profit, for com-
pletion of the contract no matter what the cost outcome. It should be
noted that for a cost outcome greater than the ceiling price, the con-
tractor's profit is negative, i.e., a loss. Also for a range of cost
outcomes less than the ceiling price, each dollar of extra cost comes
out of the contractor's profit directly. In effect, the sharing ratio
in this range is 0/100. This range is bounded by tlie point of total
assumption (PTA) on the lower cost side, and unbounded on the higher
cost side
.
The target profit is established upon, at least in part, the
degree of financial risk accepted by the contractor as determined by
the type of contract and where applicable, the sharing ratio. That :
,
an PTI contract with a 50/50 sharing ratio is assumed to be more fins -
cially risky for the contractor than one containing an 80/20 sharing
ratio. Further, a FFP contract is considered more financially risky
than a cost plus incentive fee (CPIF) contract.
The underlying assumptions of incentive contracting are:
a. That the contractor seeks to maximize profit on each
contract.
b. That the most likely, optimistic, and pessimistic cost
outcomes are established free of bias and with some degree of accuracy.






In practice there is reason to believe that each of the previous
assumptions is subject to considerable doubt.
a. Profit maximization - Contractors appear willing to
sacrifice profit on a particular contract to other goals such as long-
term profit or simply survival
.
b. The most likely cost outcome, target cost, is subject
to a number of types of bias. For example, a contractor may be willing
to accept an unrealistically low target cost if the industry is charac-
terized by overcapacity and high competition. Similarly, the government
may accept an excessively optimistic view of future cost outcome if the
competition for available funds is high within the government. The
target cost negotiated in a sole-source situation may be unrealistically
high if the government has no good basis of comparison. In which case
the contractor can increase his profit by "accepting" an FFP contract
and gain a 0/1 00 share of the underrun and a higher target profit to
boot /~ref . 1_7' And lastly, it is not currently possible to predict
future costs with any reasonable degree of accuracy on a technically
complex item which has not been produced before. Further, contract
negotiation is an adversary proceeding in which each side does its best
to protect its own interests. Such a proceeding cannot be characterized
as a cooperative search for truth in the establishment of contract tar-
get cost. For example, the contractor may raise his negotiation objec-
tive with regard to target cost to compensate for the risk of loss
imposed by the existence and value of the sharing ratio. The selection
of three costs, pessimistic, most likely and optimistic, does not de-
crease the uncertainty in the cost estimate unless valid information
is available upon which to base the cost probability distribution
8

inherent in the three costs. In the author's opinion, such information
is generally not available and the seeming decrease in cost uncertainty-
is illusory.
c. Contractor control of cost during performance -
In order to control costs during performance, the contractor must be
able to predict cost outcomes sufficiently in advance and take effec-
tive action. Attempts by a contractor to make significant improvements
in efficiency during performance of a contract may result in managerial
disutilities and may increase rather than decrease costs /~ref . 2_7 •
B. OBJECTIVE OF THE ANALYSIS
The objective of the analysis presented subsequently was to draw
statistical inferences as to the readily quantifiable contract para-
meters which have a statistically significant effect on contract out-
come in percent deviation from target cost. The chosen parameters are
ones that are measurable and known at the time the contract is signed
or shortly thereafter. These parameters are target fee, sharing ratio,
ceiling price, target cost, scheduled length of performance, number of
articles procured, the number of aircraft and missile contracts initiated
that year, and the year performance started. As originally scheduled
contract performance was not available, actual length of performance
was substituted therefor.
A further objective of this analysis was to generate, if possible,
a model which explained a significant amount of the variation from
contract to contract in the outcome percent deviation from target cost
using the contract parameters listed below. The utility of such a
model is obvious in the predictive sense.

Percent deviation from target cost was determined to be the depen-
dent variable for most of this analysis because of the three measurements
of contract outcome, cost, schedule, and performance, cost is the one
which is most readily measured and publicized. Further, the adverse
effects of system performance degradation from initial estimates and
schedule slides are difficult to identify and measure.




Initial contractor estimates of contract cost.
2. Initial governmental estimates of what the contract should
cost.
3« The degree of teclinical risk involved in the article
purchased.
ij. The changes in contract cost generated by schedule changes,
engineering change orders, governmental failures to deliver government
furnished data, rmterial and equipment on time.
$. Renegotiation of fees.
These unmeasured variables and others can be expected to result in
a rather large random variation in contract outcome as regards devia-
tion from target cost. If this variation is indeed random rather than
systematic and is distributed approximately normally, useful inferences
can be drawn from regressions and etc., that do not explain a large
part of the variation.
C. HYPOTHESES
In the opinion of the author, the following hypotheses could reason-
ably be made regarding the effects of the measured contract parameters
listed in B. on percent deviation from target cost:
10

1 . Length of performance of the contract - it might reasonably
be expected that cost deviation would increase (that is positively or
in the direction of cost overrun) as the length of performance increases.
This might be true because of the difficulty of projecting costs into
the far future, the general inflationary trend experienced, and the
increased opportunity afforded to make changes..
2
.
Target profit - Expectation would be that larger target
profits would be associated with larger positive deviations from target
cost because theoretically target profits are established on the basis
of the risk involved in the contract and other factors.
3. Sharing ratio - Actual costs moved in the negative direction
(tov7ard cost underrun). The theory of cost incentive contracting is
that the stimulus provided by an increased sharing ratio will cause the
contractor to at least attempt to operate more efficiently. Of course,
it may also stimulate him to negotiate for a higher target profit and/or
a higher target cost.
ii. Ceiling price - A higher ceiling price would be expected d
result in less attention to incurred cost and thereby tend to influen s
deviation from target cost in a positive direction. All other things
being equal, a higher ceiling price (in terms of percent of target
cost) moves the point of total assumption further from the target cost.
If the actual cost of performance exceeds the point of total assumption,
each dollar of additional cost comes directly from the contractor's
profit on the contract. In effect the contract becomes a firm fixed-
price contract (100^ sharing ratio) beyond the point of total assumption.
$. Target cost - The author does not care to hypothesize on
this variable's effect on deviation from target cost. As the dependent
variable in this analysis is the ratio of cost deviation to target cost
11

expressed in percent, all other things being equal, increases in target
cost would result in a decrease in the dependent variable . On the
other hand, to the degree that an increased target cost may reflect
increased complexity, increased time of performiance, etc., an increase
in target cost might result in a positive change in deviation from
target cost. Notwithstanding the clouding effect that choosing such
a ratio for the dependent variable has on this independent variable,
target cost, it was considered necessary to pennit meaningful compari-
son among contracts which vary in target cost from under $1 million to
over $200 million.
6. Number of articles procured - Deviation from target cost
was expected to vary negatively as the number of articles procured,
i.e., the larger the number of articles procured the less positive or
more negative cost deviation was expected to be. The larger the number
of articles procured under a particular contract the less the develop-
mental aspects of a basically production contract should effect actual
total cost. F^arther, larger production quantities would be expected
to result in operation on more favorable portions of the learning cuive
for more of the contract performance.
7. Number of Navy aircraft and missile contracts signed the
same year as a particular contract - It was expected that the larger
the number of contracts signed, the less positive or more negative de-
viation from target cost would be. The diversion of facilities and
personnel from defense to non-defense work is at best a painful and
expensive alternative for major aerospace contractors. To a lesser
degree the diversion from aircraft and missile production to other
defense production is also painful and expensive. In some cases, e.g.,
Grumman, the diversion from Navy aircraft and missile work to similar
12

work for the Air Force or Army is not particularly attractive . These
things are considered true irrespective of the size of the contractor's
investment in aircraft and missile production facilities because of
the psychological barrier to entering a field where the rules of engage-
ment are largely unknown from a field in which one is expert. Further,
a Rand Corporation report indicates that at the same time that the num-
bers of Navy aircraft and missile contracts were decreasing a like
phenomena obtained in Air Force contracts / ref . 3_7 at least as regards
total contract dollar value. In sum then, exit from the Navy aircraft
and missile market and entry into another was not easy so the effect of
a decreasing number of available contracts should be a tendency toward
a more optimistic view on the contractor's part of estimated costs
particularly in competitively negotiated procurements. If such were the
case, the final result could be expected to be a positive change in de-
viation from target cost.
8. The year the contract was signed - The author's intuitive
expectation was that contracts signed in the later years of the period
covered by the data would show more positive deviation from target cost.
The steadily increasing publicity concerning cost overruns during the
period would indicate that that was the case. The other variables'
independency of the year the contract was signed is certainly open to
question. Any of the other independent variables may prove to be time
dependent which will reduce this variable's usefulness as a predictor.
Other than as a reflection of changing contractor and/or government
policy, the author is hard pressed to explain a systematic variation
of deviation from target cost with time if such, in fact, exists.
13

II. DESCRIPTION OF DATA
A. SOURCE
The raw data were obtained by the author through the good offices
of Mr. M. E. Biciocchi, Naval Material Command^ code 022B.
B. NATURE OF THE DATA
1 . Form
The data encompass all Naval aircraft and missile fixed-price
incentive contracts completed, redetennined and approved by ONM during





d. Nomenclature and number of items procured




g. Percent deviation from target cost





(3) Ceiling price in percent of target cost
i. Final profit rate




2. Quantity of Data
The data contained 1 78 individual data points (contracts) from
which field one was deleted because it dealt with the procurement of
spare parts. Thus the population analyzed contained 177 contracts.
3. Period
Although the earliest contract in the data was signed in 1 9h9
and the latest in 1963, it was considered that results useful in the
future could be obtained therefrom. It would appear that future Navy
procurement will more closely resemble that of the 1 9k9 through 1 963
time frame than the later McNamara era. It is the author's opinion that
data taken from Mr. McNamara 's total package procurement contracts would
be of little value in attempting to draw inferences useful in the future
when total package procurement is so vigorously eschewed.
C. DATA SUMMARY






Target cost (millions of dollars)
Number of articles procured
Niimber of contracts signed per year
Deviation from target cost (percent)
2. Comment on Variables
Although target profit is intended to vary with sharing ratio













profits fell within less than one percent of the mean, 9%. This is
surprising considering that the data covers a period of 15 years and a
multitude of different procurements. It is tempting to suspect that
target profit was close to a "magic number" vjith a mode of, say, 10^.
Ceiling price seems to fall rather neatly into the same category
since the standard deviation is only five percent, and the mean, 123.2^,
falls close to the mode, 12^^.
3. Miscellaneous
The data includes purchases of combat and utility piloted air-
planes, helicopters, blimps, drones, missiles, and airborne electronic
equipment, e.g., radars. Twenty-three contractors are represented in
the data. Of these, thirteen com.pleted five or more contracts during
the period. Six completed 1 or more contracts:
Ling-Temco-Vought (10 contracts)
Convair (10 contracts)





On the' contracts contained in the data, the Navy spent a total
of $ 8,885,589,000 of which $ 8,l3l4j3liO,000 were acLual costs and
$ 75lj2U9,000 actual profits. The average profit rate realized by the
contractors was 9.2^ of actual costs. Duidng the period of the data,
defense contracting, at least in this area, was an extremely profitable
business even on the basis of sales. Return on investment figures
would, of course, be even more attractive given the large amount of
government owned facilities involved.
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III. DATA ANALYSIS ME'THODS
A. LINEAR REGRESSION
1 . Theory
Linear regression is a technique for making statements as to
the degree of linear association between a criterion (dependent) and
one or more predictor (independent) variables using the method of least
squares. If evidence exists that suggests that the form of one or more
independent variables should be of a higher degree, the original vari-
ables can be transgenerated to fit the linear assumption. The following
assumptions are required in order to make probability statements about
single or multiple linear regression:
a. That the relation between the expected value of the
dependent variable ( Y ) and an independent variable (X) (or Z or X *^
or X^ 'Xp or X-jApj etc., as previously mentioned) is linear.
b. That the error distribution is constant or homoscedat ic.
c. That no variable which is apt to effect the dependent
variable is excluded from the equation. This assumption is not impo: -
tant if the objective is forecasting.
d. That the differences between actual and estimated values
of the dependent variable are normally distributed.
Though these assumptions are not always justified in this analysis, the
insight to be gained from the linear regression is considered more im-
portant than precision.
2. Computer Code
The computer code used by the author for single and multiple
linear regressions on the dependent variable was a part of the
17

International Business Machines Scientific Subroutine Package labelled
REGRE. REGRE provides the follov/ing output for a particular regression:
a. A list of the dependent and independent variables included
in the regression along with their means and standard deviations.
b. A simple correlation coefficient (r) for each independent
variable which measures the degree to which variation in the dependent
variable is linearly associated with variation in that independent
variable. The simple correlation coefficient has a range from -1 to +1 .
Larger absolute values of the simple correlation coefficient indicate
greater correlation while the sign indicates dependent variable varia-
tion in the same direction as the independent vai-iable (+) or opposite
to the independent variable (-).
c. The regression coefficient determined for each independent
variable included in the regression (b. ,b„, ***^b ).
d. The standard error for each regression coefficient.
e. A measure of assurance that each regression coefficient is
not statistically different from zero by use of the Student t statist c.
f. The value of the estimated dependent variable when the in-
dependent variables all equal zero (intercept).
g. The multiple correlation coefficient (r) from which the
2 2
coefficient of multiple determination (R ) may be obtained. R ranges
between and 1 and represents the proportion of variation in the de-
pendent variable that is accounted for by the net linear association
of all of the independent variables included in the regression.
h. The standard error of estimate for the regression.
i. The degrees of freedom, sums of squares and mean squares
associated with an analysis of variance for the regression and the
18

resulting Snedecor F statistic which infers the degree of assurance one
may place in the fact that there is a systematic linear variation of
the dependent variable vrLth the included independent variables
.
3« Rationale for Linear Regression
Although there is some support in the literature for a non-
linear association of sharing ratio with deviation from target cost,
the analysis is based on theories of risk aversion or easy exit from
the defense market /~ref . U_7 which the author believes to be unrealis-
tic. The author's opinion on the ease of exit from or entry into the
defense market has already been stated in section I.C.?- In the
author's opinion contractors are willing to accept a high risk of de-
creased or no profits to buy into a contract because follow-on contracts
can be expected to be profitable. Contractors may also expect to im-
prove their profit position through change orders (consti'uctive or
othervri.se) during performance of the contract. A toughening government
position on this sort of activity is a creature of the late 1960's and
1970's.
In short then, the author has chosen to confine himself, except
in one case, to linear combinations of first-degree variables.
k' Stepwise Linear Regression
The form of multiple linear regression actually used by the
author in the final analysis was stepwise regression. In stepwise
regression, a sequence of multiple linear regressions are computed in
a stepwise manner. At each step one independent variable is added to
the regression equation on the basis of which of the remaining (unused)
independent variables makes the greatest reduction in the error sum of
squares. Equi.valently, the variable added next is the variable which
has the highest partial correlation with the dependent variable partialed
19

on the variables which have already been added; and equivalently it is
the variable which, if it were added, would have the highest F value.
The computer code used for stepwise regression was BIO02R
developed by the Health Sciences Computing Facility at the University
of Calif03Tiia at Los Angeles. BIO02R also produces a correlation
matrix of each independent variable with all of the other independent
variables considered for the regression equation. It also outputs a
plot of residuals versus computed values of the dependent variable for
examination for systematic trends, if any. The intercepts, Multiple R,
standard error of estimate, and analysis of variance are produced after
each step as in the linear regression code discussed previously, REGRE.
5. Linear Regressions on Segments of the Data
Linear regressions were performed for each contractor having
five or more contracts during the period relating the year the contract
was signed and the number of contracts signed that year to predict values
of percent deviation from target cost.
The plot of percent deviation from target cost versus the year
of the contract in the case of Lockheed revealed a sine wave pattern.
A special linear regression was done on the Lockheed data using the
cosine of a function of the year signed as the independent variable.
6. Target Profit as a Dependent Variable
To investigate the degree to which target profit depends upon
the negotiated sharing ratio and length of contract, linear regressions
were performed using target profit as the dependent variable and sharing
ratio and length of contract respectively as independent variables.
7. Regression Independent Variables
The follovjlng variables available in the data were considered







Length of contract period in months
Actual cost deviation from target cost
in percent of target cost (dependent
variable
)
Target profit in percent of target cost
Sharing ratio in terms of contractor's
share of the cost risk in percent
Ceiling price in percent of target cost
Target cost in millions of dollars
The number of articles procured
The number of Navy aircraft and missile
contracts signed the same year as a
particular contract
The year the contract was signed, coded
by subtracting 1 9^8
The ratio of the target cost and the n iber
of articles procured in millions of do Lars/
article
The product of the target cost and the
number of articles procured in article
-
millions of dollars
B. ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE
.1 . Theory
Analysis of variance is a way of dividing total variation in
experimental data into components that can be assigned to specific
sources. The objective is to test the statistical significance of
21

differences among average responses caused by some variable after making
allowances for other vai'iables. The label, analysis of variance, is
appropriate because if the mean responses of the test objects are
different among groups, then the variance among groups will exceed the
independently computed within-group variance.
Analysis of variance has some rather severe drawbacks when ap-
plied to nonexperimental or obser\''ational data. First, when some
classifications of the data contain one or less data point, a within-
group variance can not be computed and the mathematical rigor of the
analysis is severely reduced. This problem can be ameliorated by-
pooling of some treatments such that several data points fall in each
classification. Second, the basic analysis does not provide informa-
tion as to which treatment (s) were statistically different. The F test
performed only indicates that one or some of the populations were
actually different. Further investigation as to which treatment or
treatments were actually different from the others can be conducted
using the Scheffe con^jarison test which will be discussed later. ThJ. i,
gradual changes in the means in the data through the treatments will 3
discovered in the analysis of variance but not be isolatable by the 5 .b-
sequent comparison test. In this case, the effect of the particular
variable may be investigated through regression or a combination of
regression and analysis of variance, analysis of covariance.
The basic assumptions of the parametric analysis pf variance
are
:
a. That the observations are independently drawn from normally
distributed populations. This assumption makes the analysis parametric.





That the means in the normally distributed populations are
linear combinations of "effects" due to rows and columns, i.e., that






The computer code used by the author for one-way analysis of
variance was BMD01V developed by the Health Sciences Computing Facility
at the University of California at Los Angeles. BMDQIV outputs:
a. Treatment means and standard deviations
b. Within-groups, between-groups, and total sums of squares.
c. Within-groups, between-groups, and total degrees of freedom.
d. Within-groups and between-groups mean squares.
e. F ratio for the test of the hypothesis Hq: mean-] = mean^
=''''-
mean, .
More than one-way analyses of variance were not used by the
author because of the prohibitive severity of the empty cell or single
observation cell problem which arises in multi-way analyses. For ex-
ample, a three-way ANOVA on contractor (there are 23 of them), year
(15 of them) and item (7 of them) would contain 23 X 15 X 7 = 2i|l5
cells. Since there are 177 data points, at the least, 2ii1 5 - 1 77 =
2238 would be em.pty, and the majority of the filled cells would con-
tain only one data point.
3. Rationale for Use
The author's rationale for employing a parametric analysis of
variance is essentially that stated under linear regression.
Ij. Variables




a. Factor one - contractor with the individual contractors
being the levels of that factor (contractors that had more than one
contract during the period).










(6) Pilotless airplanes (drones)
(7) Airborne avionic equipment




If an analysis of variance has resulted in the rejection of the
equal mean hypothesis, the Scheffe comparison test (3-test) may be used
to compare levels two at a time (or more) to identify which levels were
significantly different from others, if any. Again, a gradual change
over the levels will not be identified.
2. Computer Code
Because a preprogrammed routine for the S-test was not found
available by the author, a computer code was written by the author.
That code is contained in Appendix A. No attempt was made to write a
generally applicable code. The program contained in Appendix A is
tailored to fit the data being examined in this thesis and to use the




Analyses of variance and Scheffe comparisons were conducted
upon the entire data and some individual contractor data. Individual
contractors so treated were those that completed enough contracts
during the period to make such an analysis feasible. Specifically,
the Lockheed, Grumman and Douglas data, classified by the year the
contract was signed, and pooled as necessary to have at least tvjo
observations per group, were so analyzed.
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rVo RESULTS OF DATA ANALYSIS
A. LINEAR REGRESSIONS
1 . All Contractors
a. Stepwise Linear Regression
The stepwise linear regression discussed in paragraph
II.A.ii. resulted in the follovjing multiple linear regression equation:
Percent deviation from target cost =
-U2.1i + 0.1 28X - 1 .68x
+ 0.397X. - 0.297X0 + 0.823X^ - O.OOOOl^.
,
5 o 9 1I
The independent variables entered the equation in the order
Xo, X_, X.,
^1 1 J -^Q^ ^c;* When the stepwise regression routine tenni-
nated the computation, the lowest F-ratio for a variable included in
the equation was 7.53l.t5« The highest F-ratio for a variable not in-
cluded was 1.1953* When the routine was forced to start with each of
the variables other than Xo, the resulting equation was the same unless
the routine was forced to include a variable which would not have been
otherwise included because of low F-ratio.
The linear regression variables are included here again to
ease interpretation of the results:
Symbol Description
X. Length of contract period in months
X^ Realized deviation from target cost in
2
^
percent of target cost (dependent variable
)
X Target profit in percent of target cost
Xi Sharing ratio in terms of the contractor's
share of the overrun or underrun




X, Target cost in millions of dollars
X The number of articles procured
Xo The number of Navy aircraft and missile
contracts signed the same year as a
particular contract
Xq The year the contract was signed, coded
by subtracting 1 9hQ
X-
Q
The ratio of the target cost and the number
of articles procured in millions of dollars/
article
X-.- The product of the target cost and the
number of articles procured in article-
millions of dollars
The F-ratio for the whole regression is 9 '$^9 which indi-
cates that the level of the test is higher than O.OO^. That is, the
probability that all of the regression coefficients are not zero is at
least 0.995.
The F-ratio test for each regression coefficient in the











h -1 .680 Ii.67 0.950
"5 0.397 8.37 0.995
"8 -.297 7.03 0.990
N 0.823 9.51 0.995
^1 -.oooou 7.53 0.990
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The additional variables, X.
_^
and X-., were formed from tv7o
of the original variables, X^ and X^, which were not significant in the
regression individually and were not closely correlated vrith each other
as detennined from the correlation matrix. The correlation of X/- vrith
X,-, was -.023.
^11 "^ ^6 ^7





The value of the multiple correlation coefficient (r) fo.
this regression was 0.^02. Therefore, the value of the coefficient :'
multiple determination (R ) for this regression was 0.2^2, i.e.,
approximately 2^% for the variation in the dependent variable (percent
deviation from target cost) is accounted for by the net linear associa-
tion of independent variables, X^ , X^, Xj^, Xn, Xq and X...
The standard error of estimate for the regression is +_ 7.97
percent deviation from target cost. That is, approximately 68/0 of the
estimates from the regression equation fall within +_ 7.97 of the ob-






0.80 " less than 0.75
0.68 ti " 0.75
0.38 ti " 0.50
0.90 ii " 0.75

b. Percent Deviation from Target Cost Versus Year Contract
Signed
A linear regression was perfonned relating the percent de-
viation from target cost to the contract year alone to get a historical
perspective. The resulting equation was:
% deviation from target cost =
-\\^^h + 0.573Xq
The computed t-value for this regression was 3*28 or equivalently the
F-ratio was 10.73j both meaning in this case that the probability that
the value of the regression coefficient was actually zero was .005.
The coefficient of correlation was .2I4O and the proportion of variation
in the dependent variable accounted for is approximately O.O6. The
standard error of estimate was +_ 8.82.
c. Target Profit (X ) Versus Other Contract Parameters
A series of single linear regressions were conducted to
determine if any other contract parameter known to both sides during
negotiations was a good predictor of the negotiated target profit.
The results of these regressions were as follows:
Independent
Variable Intercept bj_ R
Xj 9.60 -.0102 .232 .05
X^^ ' 8.37 .0320 .30ii
Xy 8.92 .00017 .2^1; .06
X^ 9.07 -.00182 .100
x^ 15.51 -.0529 *\\S
A multiple linear regression was performed using dependent





















h .0182 2.30 0.975
h -.0395 3.31 0.995




Standard Error of Estimate 0.773
F-value 8.06
Probability that b. ;^ 0.995
Variable X^ (Target Cost) was not included in the final
regression equation because the t-value (.01 14) did not have a high
enough probability that the regression coefficient (b^) was not equal
to zero (less than 0.75).
2 . Individual Contractors
a. Grumman
The plot of percent deviation from target cost versus year
of the contract for Grumman 's contracts contained in Figure 1 displayed
an apparent annual trend. This apparent trend suggested a linear re-
gression on percent deviation using the year the contract was signed
(X ) as the independent variable. The results of this regression were:
Intercept -I2.3ii
Regression Coefficient (bn) 1 .57
Correlation Coefficient (R) O.63I
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Std. Error of Estimate +8.20
F-value II4.5I1
Probability that h^ / 0.995
A similar linear regression of percent deviation versus the
number of contracts signed the same year as the observed contract (Xo)
was performed. The results were:
Intercept 9.68
Regression Coefficient (bg) -O.716
Correlation Coefficient (r) 0.66?
2
Determination Coefficient (R ) 0.1;5
Std. Error of Estimate 7.88
F-value 17.65
Probability that bg ;^ 0.995
Because of the predictive power displayed by variables Xo
and X in the case of the Grumman data^ the author was moved to attempt
to generate a Grnimman model for percent deviation from target cost.
This was done using the stepwise linear regression routine previously
used for the same purpose with all of the data.
One of the uncertainties of stepwise regression is that the
resulting value of the multiple correlation coefficient (R) may vary
depending upon the first independent variable used. This uncertainty
becomes particularly important when the list of independent variables
considered contains two rather powerful predictor variables (Xn and Xg)
which are closely correlated (correlation of Xn with Xq = -O.838). In
this case, the routine picks the most powerful variable and the other
is more or less automatically eliminated from further consideration by
its high correlation with the first variable used. To eliminate this
32

uncertainty of result, the stepwise regression was conducted vri.th all
independent variables free and then another stepwise regression was
conducted in which the routine tjas forced to start vri.th the previously
unused variable. The results of these two stepwise linear regressions
were
:















Correlation Coefficient (R) 0.7^2
2
Determination Coefficient (R ) 0.^7
Std. Error of Estimate +7.1 li
F-ratio for the Regression 13.6i;6
Probability all bj_ / 0.995





b. 0.101 2.26 0.750+
b -10.8 12.86 0.995+
b^ 2.7li 39.19 0.995++
Intercept 72.22
Correlation Coefficient (r) 0.82
Determination Coefficient (R^) 0.66
Std. Error of Estimate +6.^3
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F-ratio for the Regression 13.20
Probability all b. / 0.995++
b. Lockheed
A plot of percent deviation from target cost versus the
year the contract was signed for Lockheed (Figure 2) also revealed an
interesting pattern. This pattern looked to the author like a sine
wave. The independent variable for a linear regression was determined
to be a function of the year the contract was signed (X = cos(360/12
(Xq - 2) + 90)) where the period of the wave was approximated as 12
years. The regression equation used was then % deviation = a + bX.
The results of this regression and an ordinary linear regression for
comparison were:
X = cos(360/12(X^ - 2) + 90) X = X^
Intercept (a) -2.3 -ii.3l
Regression Coefficient (b) 2.ii 0.272
Correlation Coefficient (R) .38? 0.222
Determination Coefficient (R ) 0.1
5
.05
F-value Ii.928 1 .ii57
Probability that b ?^ 0.950 0.75C
0. Other
Plots of percent deviation versus year for the other con-
tractors displayed no discemable significant pattern.
Linear regressions of percent deviation versus number of
contracts signed that year for the other contractors failed to reach
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B. ANALYSES OF VARIANCE AND SCHEFFE COMPARISONS
1 . By Contractor
a. Analysis of Variance
Preparatory to conducting a one-way analysis of variance by
contractor, the data field was reduced by removing the data for those
contractors who had only one contract during the period. Each remaining
contractor was designated as a treatment level of the factor, contrac-
tor. The sample size
,
mean percent deviation and standard deviation










































Treatment Size Mean Deviation
Philco 2 II4.25 17.ii7
Raytheon 3 -8.20 I3.I7
The F-ratio for this analysis of variance was 2.76 which
allows rejection at a significance level of .00^ of the hypothesis
that the treatment samples all came from the same population. That is,
one may be ,99^ confident that the treatment samples did not all come
from the same population. However, the analysis of variance does not
allow selection of any treatment as being significantly different from
another. That is, one may not say that Philco with a mean percent de-
viation from target cost of 1U.25 is significantly different from
Raytheon with a mean percent deviation of -8.20.
b. Scheffe Comparison
To continue the investigation started in a. above, a
Scheffe Comparison test was conducted using the F-value corresponding
to the level of significance designated by statisticians as statis-
tically significant, .05. The result was that none of the treatments
(contractors) were different from any of the others at that level.
The level of the comparison was successively reduced until differences
began to appear. At a significance of 0.2^ there was still no statis-
tical differences between contractors. At a significance level of
0.^0 differences began to emerge, but this is the statistical equivalent




2. By Type of Item Purchased
a. Analysis of Variance
To determine whether percent deviation from target cost
were significantly different among different types of items purchased,
a one-way analysis of variance was conducted in which the type of item
V7as the factor and the treatment levels were the seven different types
of items purchased which have been previously identified. The mean








Combat Airplanes 88 -0.98 8.52
Missiles 19 -2.1ii 10.82
Blimps 6
-h'lO a. 75
Helicopters .28 2.37 11.08
Drones 8 1.08 7.1;7
Airborne Avionics 8 -1.18 9.50
The F-ratio for this analysis was 1
.US' which corresponds to
a level of between .25 and .10. This level is insufficient to allow
rejection of the hypothesis that the treatment samples came from the
t
same population, therefore further investigation using the Scheffe
comparison test was not justified.
3. Individual Contractors by Year the Contract Was Signed
Three of the contractors were selected for separate analyses
of variance on the basis that they had more than 20 contracts during
the period. The year the contract was signed was selected as the
factor for one-way analyses to determine if any sharp changes in
38

contractor policy or environment had occurred which would not have




(1 ) Analysis of Variance . Lockheed started and completed
30 contracts during the period of the data. The Lockheed data were
pooled into two-year treatments to provide adequate numbers of observa-
tions in each cell and the odd contract was dropped. The sample sizes,






^9h9 & 1950 3 -0.73 3.92
1951 & 1952 10
-h'99 3.83
1953 & ^9Sh 3 -5.37 ii.30
1955 & 1956 h 0.68 2.ii2
1 957 & 1 958 3 1;.67 3.25
1 959 & 1 960 6 -3.07 3.38
The F-ratio for this analysis was lj..5I|. which allows
rejection of the one -population hypothesis at a significance level 01
.005. Because the hypothesis was rejected at a very significant
t
level, the Scheffe comparison was performed.
(2) Scheffe Comparison . A Scheffe comparison was con-
ducted using the F-value corresponding to a significance level of .05,
"statistically significant". The pooled years 1951 and 1952 were de-
termined to be significantly different from the pooled years 1957 and
1958. However, in view of the sine-wave pattern exhibited by the Lock-






^9k9 - 1951 6 -10.33
1952 - 195U 8 -1.59
1 955 - 1 957 h -0.70
1961 - 1963 h 10.65
(paragraph IV. 2. b), this appears to be a coiaparison of the peak of
the wave with the valley.
b. Grumman
(1 ) Analysis of Variance . Gmrraaan started and completed
2k contracts during the period of the data. These data were pooled
into three-year treatments and a one-way analysis of variance was








The F-ratio for this analysis was 5*07 which allows
rejection of the one -population hypothesis at the .025 level.
(2) Scheffe Comparison . The Scheffe comparison was con-
ducted using an F-value corresponding to a significance level of .025*
This level falls between "statistically significant" and "statistically
very significant". Pooled years 1 9ii9 - 1951 were found to be signifi-
cantly different from pooled years 1 961 - I963. This finding agrees
with the significant positive trend identified in the Grumman data in
paragraph IV. 2. a.
c. Douglas
Douglas started and completed 2k contracts during the period
under investigaLion. These data were pooled in two-year treatments
and a one-way analysis of variance was performed. The sample sizes,






1 9li9 & 1 950 3
1 951 & 1 952 8
1953 & 1951i 6
1955 & 1956 2
1 957 & 1 958 2









The F-ratio for this analysis was 0.29 which is not statis-




The most that can be gained from the results of the analyses pre-
sented in Section IV alone are statistical inferences. Firstly, no
cause/effect relationships can be established by statistical analysis.
Secondly, failure to reject a one -population hypothesis or a b. =0
hypothesis does not prove that those hypotheses were time. It merely
states that with the statistical methods and standards employed and
the data analyzed, it was not possible to reject those hypotheses.
Nevertheless, the author will draw conclusions on the basis that the
statistical analysis combined with the author's intuition and knowledge,
and other sources of information present a reasonable case, lacking
opposing evidence, for the conclusion drawn. The reader who is unwill-
ing to accept the author's conclusions on such a basis is free to draw
his own or none from the statistical evidence presented in Section 17
of this paper.
A. CONTRACT PARAMETERS' EFFECT ON DEVIATION FROM TARGET COST
1 . Parameters Which Have a Significant Effect on Contract Cost
Outcome
a. All contractors
(1 ) Length of the period of contract performance - Devia-
tion from target cost varied positively with the length of performance
of the contract at the rate of approxirrHtely 1 .S% per year. The
author's hypothesis about this variable was supported by the data.
In view of the length of time available for changes in both requirements
li2

and details in a multi-yoar contract, and the general inflationary
trend in this country since World War II, this is not a surprising
conclusion.
(2) Target profit - Deviation from target profit varied
negatively as target profit at a rate of more than 1 % per percent
target profit increase. The conclusion that may be drawn here is:
depending upon the sharing ratio, it may be less expensive in terms
of total price for the government to be relatively generous in target
profit. For example, in a contract with a 10^ target profit and a
sharing ratio, a one percent increase in target profit may be expected
to result in a 1.3^ decrease in realized cost and a 0.3^ decrease in
actual price. As the variations in target profit in the data were
small, one would not be justified in making large target profit adjust-
ments on this basis. The author's hypothesis with respect to target
profit was not supported by the statistical analysis. The author has
no intuitive explanation to offer for this rather surprising result.
(3) Ceiling price - Deviation from target cost varied
positively with ceiling price at the rate of approximately O.u^ per
percent increase in ceiling price. The author's hypothesis with re-
spect to the effect of ceiling price was supported by the analysis.
(U) The number of contracts signed in the Navy aircraft
and missile field during the same year as a particular contract -
Deviation from target cost varied negatively as the number of contracts
signed. This variable was chosen as a measure of the degree of compe-
tition (or pressure) felt by a contractor when negotiating a particular
contract. The theory being that as the total number of contracts in
the Navy aircraft and missile field becomes smaller, the importance in
li3

terms of prime contractor survival of obtaining a particular contract
goes up. Reaction to this pressure in the form of acceptance of an
unrealistically low target cost does not require that the contractor
knowingly buy in. All he has to do is to relax a little his normal
degree of resistance to engineering optimism, etc. The author's hypo-
thesis regarding the effect on deviation from target cost of reduced
number of available contracts is supported by the analysis. One is
reminded of the apocryphal story of the gambler vjho took part in a
game he knew to be rigged against him because "It was the only game in
tovm." The stoiy nay be apocryphal but its message is valid.
(5) The year the contract was signed - The deviation from
target cost varied positively as the year the contract was signed.
The author's hypothesis in this regard was supported by the analysis.
The only explanation that occurs to the author for this result of the
analysis is a gradual change with time of contractor policy toward cost
overruns. It is significant that although the year the contract was
signed and the number of contracts that year are rather closely related.
they both 'are significant in the regression equation. Thus, one may
not say that the positive effect of the year the contract was signed
was simply a result of the intensified competitive atmosphere.
(6) The product of the target cost and the number of
items procured - Deviation from target cost varied negatively as the
product of target cost and the number of items procured. The author's
statistical reasoning concerning a combination of two unrelated vari-
ables which singly vrere insignificant was supported by the appearance
in the regression equation of this variable. The author v/as then faced
with the necessity of attempting an explanation of this statistical
Uli

fact in logical terms. This, he has been unable to do. Nevertheless,
the predictive power of this variable remains whether or not the author
can state a logical explanation.
b. Individual Contractors
(1 ) Grumman . Deviation from target cost in the case of
Grumman contracts showed a strong reaction to both the year the contract
was signed and the number of like contracts signed that year. The year
the contract xms signed alone accounted for kO% of the variation in
Grumman 's deviation from target cost. When all of the original variables
and the tvjo transgenerated ones were considered in a stepwise linear
regression on the Grumman data, deviation from target cost varied nega-
tively vjith the number of contracts signed and positively with the unit
cost of the item procured (target cast/number of items procured). To-
gether, these two variables accounted for $7% of the variation in
Grumman 's deviation from target cost. These two variables have approxi-
mately twice the predictive power in Grumman 's case than the variables
included in the regression equation for all contractors. No conclusions
were drawn from the second regression (routine forced to use X per
IV. A. 2. a) because one of the variables included by the stepwise linear
regression routine had only a .75 probability that its regression
coefficient (b^ ) was not equal to zero.
Grumman 's heavy dependence on Navy airframe contracts
goes a long way toward explaining this result. The complexity involved
in high unit cost items also provides a reasonable explanation of the
positive variation of deviation from target cost xri.th unit cost. The
implications of this predictive equation with respect to the current
cost overrun problems associated with the F-1 h program are obvious if
h^

one allows a valid comparison between non-total package procurement
contracts and total package procurement ones.
(2) Lockheed . The impression that Lockheed's deva.ations
from target cost were cyclical with time was supported by the linear
regression which used a cosine function of Xq as the independent
variable. As compared to a linear regression using X as the indepen-
dent variable, the correlation coefficient, determination coefficient
and F-ratio vxere materially improved. The extent that the cosine
equation accounts for the variation, 1 5^, Lockheed deviation from
target cost oscillated about a level of -2.3^ with an amplitude of
2,\\%. Since the cyclical pattern does not occur when deviation from
target cost is plotted against the number of contracts signed that
year, one is tempted to postulate a cyclically varying management
policy toward cost estimation or negotiated target cost. This theory
would involve a more optimistic view of probable costs that is tempered
as the results of the optimism begin to be apparent and then a shift





Lockheed and Grumman . Although the analysis of vari-
ance conducted using the contractors as treatment levels provided no
statistical basis for significant difference among contractors, the
Lockheed and Grumman patterns of deviation from target cost were marked-
ly different from the other contractors when plotted against the year
the contract was signed. In both, trends over time were apparent.
These time trends should be considered when negotiating contracts mth
two contractors. That is, Grumman 's tendency to underestimate or accept
unrealistically low target costs had steadily increased while Lockheed
li6






Parameters which are -unexpectedly insignificant can be as
informative as those that prove to be significant. Accordingly, they
will be given as much attention as were the significant parameters.
a. Sharing ratio - The theory of cost-jjicentive contracting
rests upon the supposed influence a share of imderrun or overrun will
have upon a contractor's cost-associated decisions. Further j multiple
incentive contracts depend upon an assumption that the various per-
formance and schedule incentives will be balanced against the cost
incentive iri the contractor's tradeoff decisions to the advantage of
the contractor and the government. If the cost incentive proves to be
ineffective and the results relatively unpredictable, then the supposed
benefits of multiple incentive contracting must also be seriously
doubted. This is a point of considerable importance since the addi-
tional cost of administering a multiple -incentive contract may be
largely wasted.
In the case of the 1 77 Navy aircraft and missile contract
examined in this thesis, sharing ratio is an insignificant parameter
with respect to association with cost overrun/underrun (probability
the b. / between 0.^0 and 0.75)- This is not a wholly surprising
outcome in that a Rand study of ii27 Air Force contracts resulted in a
conclusion that the value of the sharing ratio was an insignificant
parameter /~*ref . 5 7 • Because the Air Force contract data contained
both cost incentive and cost reimbursable contracts, F^nd was also
able to conclude that although the value of the sharing ratio was
hi

insignificant, deviations from target cost were significantly more
positive in cost-reimbursable contracts than in cost-incentive con-
tracts. An explanation which might be made is that the existence of
the incentive completely unrelated to the value of the sharing ratio
might influence contractor performance of the contract. A more likely
explanation is that the use of an incentive contract in a particular
case may have resulted in an upward shift in the negotiated target
cost / ref . 6_7 . Since cost -reimbursable contracts encourage contrac-
tors to grossly understate expected costs to ensure receiving the
contract, cost -incentive contracts may have the benefit to the govern-
ment of preventing grossly understated expected costs.
In any case, the analysis contained herein in no v;ay supports
the theory that sharing the cost risk with the contractor significantly
effects his efficiency of performance of the contract or influences him
in cost-associated decision making.
b. Target cost/Unit target cost - Neither target cost nor unit
target cost were significantly associated with deviation from target
cost. Some attractively logical hypotheses regarding these parameters,
e.g., that lower unit cost should be associated with more negative
deviation from target cost because of economies of scale and the learn-
ing curve. That is, one would suppose that the expected positive de-
viation from target cost would be higher in a $1 00 M contract for 100
items (unit cost of $1 M) than a $1 00 M contract for 10,000 items (unit
cost of $10,000). That attractive theory must be allowed to wither for
lack of empirical support. However, one might consider the possibility
that contractors depend too heavily on economies of scale, etc., in
their cost estimates, or that the discontinuities in production fre-
quently resulting from the annual nature of defense funding may tend to
U8

prevent gaining the cost advantages of economies of scale or the
learning curve
.
c. Number of items - Similar arguments to those applied to
unit cost could be applied to the number of items, i.e., the larger
the number of items the more negative the deviation from target cost,
but such arguments were similarly unsupported by the data.
d. Contractor - No statistical significance could be attached
to the contrasts among contractors. However, if faced with a choice
between Kaman (mean percent deviation from target cost = 11 .9$, standard
deviation = 12.97) and Vertol (mean percent deviation from target cost =
-U.??} standard deviation = $ -hQ) other things being essentially equal,
one would be foolish to choose Kaman on the basis that the difference
in contract experience with the two contractors was not statistically
significant
.
e. Type of item - Although the items procured under the 177
contracts in the data differ radically in physical terms, they were all
procured by the same agency, NAVAIRSYSCOM, to aviation standards . No
statistically significant differences were found among them. The means
differ noticeably but the associated variances are too large to allow
statistically significant differences among the means.
B. OVERRUN/UNDERRIM PREDICTr/E MODEL (ALL DATA)
The following discussion refers to the predictive model reported in
paragraph 17. A.I .a,
Percent deviation from target cost ==
-i;2.ii + 0.128X, - 1 .68X, + 0.397X^ - 0.297Xq + 0.823X^ - O.OOOOUX,, .13 5 9 n
k9

1 . Amount of Variation Explained
The power of the model to explain the variation in the analyzed
data, approximately 25^, was disappointingly low. Its power to predict
future contract outcomes, of course, is unknown but should not be ex-
pected to improve over that for the data from which it was generated.
Still, a model of this nature might give some inkling of the outcome
of a particular future contract. It is probably better than an assump-
tion that the contract outcome in terms of actual cost will be equal to
the negotiated target cost. The argument here, albeit a weak one, is
that the model is probably better than no consideration of the histori-
cal realities of contract outcome. But, of course, past realities may
or may not be similar to future realities. As is the case \n.th many
mathematical models, most of the value of this model is in understand-
ing the relationships or lack of them among the variables.
2. Standard Error of Estimate
The large standard error of estimate, approximately 8^, is in
keeping with the low amount of variation accounted for. The model as
a valid predictor of future contract outcome is largely useless.
C. THE RELATIONSHIP OF TARGET PROFIT TO OTHER CONTRACT PARAMETERS
Three other contract parameters were found to be statistically
related to negotiated target profit. They were sharing ratio, ceiling
price, and number of items procured. Together these variables follow
the previous trend, that they account for little of the variation of
target profit. This discussion will concern the individual variables.
1 . Sharing ratio - Target profit varied positively with sharing
ratio. The theory that the contractor who bears the larger financial
risk should be rewarded with a higher target profit appears to be
^0

supported in this case. A similar conclusion was reached by Rand in
its study of 1|27 Air Force contracts /~ref . 7_7 •
2. Ceiling price - The negotiated target profit varied negatively
with ceiling price. A higher ceiling price reduces the contractor's
financial risk by causing the point of total assumption (PTA) to occur
further from the target cost. All other things being equal, the further
the PTA is from the target cost, the lower the probability of the con-
tractor finding himself in the position of paying excess costs out of
his own pocket, dollar for dollar. Again, the lovjer the financial risk,
the lower target profit, and vice versa.
3. Number of items procured - The target profit varied positively
as the number of items procured. No explanation for this phenomena was
apparent to the author.
D. SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS
The statistical inference really worthy of note in this thesis is
the repeated failure of empirical evidence to support the supposed
effectiveness of the sharing ratio. Since the cost incentive is the
cornerstone of incentive contracting and incentive contracting is in
extensive use today, it is a little disconcerting to find no empirica±
evidence to support it, i.e., percent deviation from target cost is
not statistically related to the sharing ratio. It would seem prudent,
lacking supportive evidence, to not place such dependence on incentive
contracting to influence efficient contractor performance. Faith in
an unprovable principle has its place in religious matters but not, in




COMPUTER CODE FOR THE SCHEFFE
COI^ARISON (S-TEST)
The following computer code is wiritten in FORTRAN G and was used on
an IBM 36O computer.
C PROGRAM TO TEST FOR SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENT IN ANOVA TREATMENTS
C USING SCHEFFE METHOD
READ (5,10) NGRDUP, SQUARE, F7AL
10 FORMAT (I2,2F10.1;)
DIMENSION ISA14SZ (30 ), ERI'IF:AN(30 ) ,ERT0T(30 )
DO 15 J=1 ,NGROUP
READ (5,12) ISAMZ(J),ERMEAN(J)
12 FORMAT (I2,F12.5)










COMP=ISAMSZ (K )-;;-ERTOT(l )-I3AMSZ (I )-;;-ERT0T(K )









110 FORMAT ('0', 'GROUP ',2X,I2,l4X,' GROUP' ,2X,I2,l4X/COMPARISON=',
1 F1 2 . i;, i^ , ' AVARIANCE=
'
, F1 2 . i;
)
IF (GOMP.LE.AVAR) GO TO 1 50
WRITE (6,120) I,K
120 FORMAT ( '0', '-;««;-);- GROUP'
,
IX, 12, IX, 'IS SIGNIFICAJ^TLY DIFFERENT FROM








Explanation of Input Variables
Number of treatment groups (levels)
Within-groups mean square value from
preceeding ANOVA
F ratio for desired level of significance
of the comparison based on between-groups
and within-groups degrees of freedom from
the ANOVA. Example: If the between groups
degrees of freedom are 3 and the within-
groups 18, and the desired level of test is
.025, the value of FVAL is 3-9539.
53

(^3,1 8;. 025= 3.9S39).
ISAMSZ(j) The sample size in the jth treatraent group
ERMEAN(J) The mean of the jth treatraent group
Limitations
The program as contained herein is limited to: (1 ) no more than
30 treatment groups and accompanying values of ISAMSZ and ER>EAN, and
(2) comparison of each treatment group with each of the other treat-
ment groups.
Sample Output
GROUP 1 GROUP h COMPARISON= ii93.3989 AVARIMCE= U36.9731
3C-X-X-X- GROUP 1 IS SIGNIFICANTLY DIFFERENT FROM GROUP h ^"-"-^
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f basic contract parameters to contract outcome is explored through regression and
lalysis of variance techniques.
The inferences arising from the statistical analysis are combined with other
iformation to draw conclusions regarding incentive contracting. The most important
f these is that there is no evidence that the negotiated sharing ratio has any
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